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NO MORE TEACHERS' DIRTY LOOKS-NOW THEY SUE:
AN ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF STATUS
DETERMINATIONS IN DEFAMATION ACTIONS
BY PUBLIC EDUCATORS
RICHARD E. JOHNSON*
The constitutionalization of defamation law in 1964 created a
revolution in first amendment jurisprudence. The United States
Supreme Court established protection for statements concerning
public officials unless the statements were made with actual malice,
i.e., knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity.
Later, the Court extended much of that protection to statements
about public figures who are not government employees. Though the
Court eventually narrowed the scope of its public figure doctrine, it
never receded from the protection accorded to statements about
public officials. The author of this Article contends that this
distinction has eluded many state judges and that the less-protective
public figure doctrine may be swallowing the public official doctrine
in state court interpretations of the first amendment. An analysis of
state court cases with public educators as plaintiffs shows that many
state courts are misapplying public figure law to status
determinations that are properly within the public official sphere.
T HE APPLICABILITY of the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan'
actual malice standard to public school educators is almost cer-
tainly the most clouded area of public official defamation law. Much
of the judicial disarray on this subject is of fairly recent origin and has
escaped the attention of most commentators. Although Laurence
Tribe has stated that the public official designation "now embraces
virtually all persons affiliated with the government, such as most ordi-
nary civil servants, including public school teachers and policemen," ' 2
the status of public school teachers is alarmingly unsettled. The in-
creasingly contradictory nature of status determinations for teachers
may be symptomatic of a more general erosion of the foundations of
* General Manager, The Florida Flambeau, Tallahassee, Florida; B.A., 1969, M.A., 1973,
J.D., 1990, Florida State University.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see infra text accompanying notes 5-11.
2. L. TRIE, AmmCAN CoNsTrrTIONAL LAW 866 (2d ed. 1988).
762 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 17:761
the first amendment as applied to public official defamation plain-
tiffs.
Media law scholars have been comparatively complacent about pub-
lic official law, concentrating instead on the aleatory condition of
public figure law.' The scope of this Article is more modest, focusing
instead on status determinations of one major occupational category
of defamation plaintiffs: public school educators. This relatively nar-
row inquiry has broader implications for the future of other categories
of plaintiffs commonly regarded as public officials. 4 If the public offi-
cial doctrine is being swallowed by the less protective public figure
doctrine, except in cases involving the highest officials, the result
could be a "sea change" in the constitutional law of defamation; this
well may be the trend.
Although the first amendment holdings of state courts may lack the
sweeping impact associated with those of federal appellate courts,
state courts are the forums in which most of these determinations are
made. Over time, state court holdings tend to be cumulative and mu-
tually reinforcing. The developments discussed here constitute a pow-
erful undercurrent that has been invisible to most observers.
The first section of this Article briefly summarizes the development
of the public official doctrine in federal constitutional law. The sec-
ond section examines the key state cases in which the doctrine has
been applied to public educators. The third section seeks to dispel
confusion by identifying the factors that have led some courts astray.
The fourth section proposes an analytical framework for resolving the
confusion. The Appendix is a tabular representation of the major
cases in the field and the variables that might have influenced their
outcomes.
I. BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court constitutionalized the law of def-
amation in the landmark case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' A
Montgomery, Alabama city commissioner sued the New York Times
for its publication of an advertisement alleging misconduct by various
3. Judicial efforts to clarify the definition of public figures have been generally unsuccess-
ful. Cases in this area are notable for their unpredictable outcomes. See, e.g., B. SANFORD, LIBEL
AND PRIVACY 189-283 (1985); R. SMOLLA, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 2-4 to 2-104; Christie, Un-
derlying Contradictions in the Supreme Court's Classification of Defamation, 1981 DUtKE L.J.
811; Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U.
PA. L. REv. 1 (1983); Comment, Defining a Public Controversy in the Constitutional Law of
Defamation, 69 VA. L. REv. 931 (1983).
4. See infra note 208.
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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officials seeking to prevent racial integration. 6 The theoretical founda-
tion of New York Times is that government participation, through the
judicial system, in the punishment of persons making statements criti-
cal of public officials is a departure from the central meaning of the
first amendment. The Court considered the right to criticize these offi-
cials indistinguishable from the right to criticize the government on
behalf of which they act. 7
The Court held that recovery for defamation by a public official
must be premised upon a showing of "actual malice," which requires
a showing that the offending statement was made with knowledge of
its falsity or reckless disregard of whether it was false.8 Further, the
proof of actual malice must be by clear and convincing evidence, not
just by a preponderance of the evidence. 9 To ensure compliance by
lower courts, the Supreme Court took the extraordinary step of pro-
viding for de novo appellate review of factual findings of actual mal-
ice. 0 However, the Court did not provide criteria for identifying those
who fit the public official designation. The Court stated that it had
"no occasion here to determine how far down into the lower ranks of
government employees the 'public official' designation would extend
for purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify the categories of per-
sons who would or would not be included.""
One question the Supreme Court did not address in New York
Times was how far the scope of protected commentary on public offi-
cials extended. The Court addressed that question in Garrison v.
Louisiana.12 The Court held that the actual malice privilege attaches to
"anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office."' 3
Seeking to refine the definition of actual malice, the Court also held
that only those statements "made with [a] high degree of awareness of
their probable falsity" are made with reckless disregard.' 4
In Rosenblatt v. Baer,5 the Court returned to the definition of
"public official." High level appointees and all elected officials were
6. The political advertisement contained several errors of fact. Some were minor, such as
that demonstrators sang the national anthem instead of "My Country 'Tis of Thee." Others
were more serious, such as an erroneous allegation that police padlocked a school cafeteria in an
effort to starve out student demonstrators. Id. at 258.
7. Id. passim.
8. Id. at 279-80.
9. Id. at 285-86.
10. Id. at 284-85.
11. Id. at 283 n.23.
12. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). A New Orleans district attorney was prosecuted under a criminal
libel statute for his criticisms of various Louisiana judges. Id. at 66.
13. Id. at 77.
14. Id. at 74.
15. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). A newspaper columnist alleged misconduct on the part of a local
official in charge of a public skiing facility. Id. at 78.
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no longer in question, but for other officials, the Court held that a
determination of public official status should focus on the public in-
terest in the position rather than on the official's rank in the govern-
ment hierarchy. Accordingly, the "actual malice" standard applies to
"those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or
appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control
over the conduct of governmental affairs.' 1 6 The Court offered fur-
ther guidance: the actual malice standard is triggered when "a posi-
tion in government has such apparent importance that the public has
an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the
person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifi-
cations and performance of all government employees.' '1 7 Emphasiz-
ing that the standard is based on the position itself rather than on any
specific issue arising around it, the Court added: "The employee's po-
sition must be one which would invite public scrutiny and discussion
of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discus-
sion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy."',8 The 1966
Rosenblatt decision was the last time the Court offered any meaning-
ful clarification of who could be classified as a public official. 19
In the companion cases Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associ-
ated Press v. Walker,20 the Court created the "public figure" doc-
trine, which extended the actual malice standard beyond government
employees. In doing so, the Court recognized that people such as Wal-
lace Butts and Edwin Walker, although not employed by the govern-
ment, might have a major influence on the debate and resolution of
important social issues. Butts, technically an employee of a private
corporation, directed the athletic program at the University of Geor-
gia. Walker, a retired general, was a leader in conservative causes,
including resistance to school desegregation. The Court found that the
public had an interest in unfettered debate over the behavior of both
Butts and Walker-Butts because of the position he occupied, 21 and
16. Id. at 85.
17. Id. at 86.
18. Id. at 87 n.13.
19. A dictum in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979), states: "The Court
has not provided precise boundaries for the category of 'public official'; it cannot be thought to
include all public employees, however." It is difficult to see how this added anything to the
definition.
20. The cases are reported together at 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
21. Id. at 155. Those who qualify as public figures by position alone have come to be
known as "pervasive" or "all-purpose" public figures. The classification is limited to those who
are well-known, in some field of endeavor, to the general public. For defamation purposes, they
are treated the same as public officials. See, e.g., Carson v. Allied News, 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir.
1976) (Johnny Carson); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1976) (William F. Buckley, Jr.);
Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Reptr. 206 (1983) (Carol
Burnett); Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. 1979) (Ralph Nader).
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Walker because of his penchant for thrusting himself into the vortex
of public controversies, such as taking a leadership role in the struggle
to prevent integration of the University of Mississippi. 22 These two
ways of becoming a public figure remain the essential prototypes.
In an attempt to end division in the lower courts over the meaning
of "reckless disregard," the Court granted certiorari in St. Amant v.
Thompson23 and established that "reckless disregard" did not exist
where an honest mistake arose from mere failure to investigate a state-
ment that turned out to be false or from ill-will toward the plaintiff.
A determination of actual malice must focus on the defendant's atti-
tude toward the statement rather than toward the plaintiff or situa-
tion. The Court held: "There must be sufficient evidence to permit
the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as
to the truth of his publication." 24
Three years later the Court further refined the scope of privileged
commentary on public officials in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy25 and
Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron,2 both decided the same day. Not-
ing the centrality of the first amendment to the electoral process, the
Court held that candidates for office as well as actual occupants of
those offices should be considered public officials. 27 The Court also
held that an allegation of criminal misconduct against an official or
candidate, no matter how remote in time, is protected by the actual
malice privilege. 2
The Supreme Court reached the high-water mark in constitutional
protection for good-faith defamation in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., extending the actual malice privilege to matters of "public or
general interest" without regard to the status or identity of the plain-
tiff.29 Speaking for a plurality, Justice Brennan asserted:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is
22. Walker, 388 U.S. at 155. This prototype came to be known as the "vortex" or "lim-
ited" public figure. Persons in this category are public figures only for purposes of commentary
about a particular controversy with which they are associated.
23. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
24. Id. at 731. A candidate for office attacked the integrity of a deputy sheriff. Id. at 728.
25. 401 U.S. 265 (1971). A newspaper accused candidate of being a "former small-time
bootlegger." Id. at 265.
26. 401 U.S. 295 (1971). Local official was running for higher office when newspaper mis-
took him for his brother and reported he had been arrested. Id. at 296.
27. Roy, 401 U.S. at 271.
28. Damron, 401 U.S. at 300.
29. 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971). A radio station accused a magazine distributor of circulating
obscene literature. Id. at 33.
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involved, or because in some sense the individual did not
'voluntarily' choose to become involved. The public's primary
interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the
participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct,
not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. 0
This broader application of first amendment protection proved to be
short-lived.
At the height of official concern about the power of the press in the
Watergate scandal, President Nixon's new appointees on the Court
helped form a majority which overruled Rosenbloom in the watershed
case Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. In Gertz, a magazine published by
the John Birch Society falsely accused a prominent Chicago attorney,
Elmer Gertz, of being a "Leninist," a "communist-fronter," and an
organizer of a conspiracy to frame a police officer for murdering a
teenager. 3' The Court rejected the issue-oriented approach of Rosen-
bloom as too burdensome on private persons seeking to vindicate their
reputations in defamation actions arising from controversial issues in
which they had been involved. The Court held that such plaintiffs de-
serve a less stringent standard of fault because unlike public persons,
they lack access to the media for counter-speech and have not as-
sumed the risk of greater scrutiny by seeking the limelight.3 2
In narrowing the actual malice standard to encompass only public
officials and public figures, the Gertz Court defined public figures as
those who "have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs
of society." 33 This status can be attained by acquiring "pervasive
fame or notoriety" or, alternatively, by entering into a particular pub-
lic controversy with the intention of influencing its outcome. 34 Mem-
bers of this first category have been denominated "pervasive ' or "all-
purpose" public figures. Commentary on such public figures qualifies
for the actual malice test "for all purposes and in all contexts." 35
Members of the second category are generally characterized as "lim-
ited" or "vortex" public figures. They must prove actual malice only
for statements related to the controversy in which they participated.3 6
The Court acknowledged an "involuntary" public figure category,
but described it as "exceedingly rare." 37
30. Id. at 43.
31. 418 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1974).
32. Id. at 344-45.
33. Id. at 345.
34. Id. at 351.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 352
37. Id. at 345.
TEA CHERS AS DEFAMATION PLAINTIFFS
While eliminating the public issue standard, the Gertz Court made
some comparatively minor concessions to first amendment interests.
The Court required proof of fault in all defamation actions-a devel-
opment that eradicated the common law tradition of strict liability in
defamation suits. 38 The Court also forbade presumed and punitive
damages for all plaintiffs absent a showing of actual malice.3 9
Public figure law continued its regression in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
a case emerging from a report of the spectacular and highly publicized
divorce of the Firestone tire fortune heir and his socialite wife. 40 The
case involved allegations of sexual adventures on both sides that, in
the words of the trial judge, "would have made Dr. Freud's hair
curl."14' Mrs. Firestone subscribed to a press clipping service and held
several press conferences during the proceedings to communicate her
side of the story. 42 Concluding that Mrs. Firestone was "compelled to
go to court" to seek dissolution of her marital bonds and that she
assumed no "special prominence in the resolution of public ques-
tions," the Court found her not to be a public figure. 43 Moreover, the
Court observed that since Mrs. Firestone could not reasonably expect
to influence the judge by her press conferences, she was not trying to
influence the resolution of the controversy."
Further contraction of public figure law occurred in Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Association, Inc. 45 and Hutchinson v. Proxmire.46 In
Wolston the Court held that the plaintiff was not a public figure for
purposes of his arrest years earlier, which resulted from an investiga-
tion of Soviet espionage, because his role in the ensuing controversy
was involuntary. The Court expressed an unwillingness to allow a
plaintiff to become a public figure merely for refusing to comply with
a grand jury subpoena and consequently being cited for contempt. 47
The Court also noted the plaintiff's lack of media access to rebut the
charges against him."
The Court in Hutchinson found the plaintiff to be a private figure
for purposes of a defamation action arising from comments made by
38. Id. at 347-49.
39. Id. at 349.
40. 424 U.S. 448, 450 (1976).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 485-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 454-55.
44. Id. at 454 n.3.
45. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
46. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
47. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166-67.
48. Id. at 170-71 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
1990]
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Senator William Proxmire. 49 Announcing his "Golden Fleece"
awards, Senator Proxmire charged that the plaintiff was wasting tax-
payers' money by conducting frivolous research to determine the rea-
sons monkeys clench their jaws. The Court held that a general
concern about allegedly wasteful government spending was insuffi-
cient to privilege comments about a particular example, absent a pre-
existing controversy over that expenditure.50 The Court established the
rule that a defendant who originated a controversy could not enjoy
privileged commentary upon it. 5
II. CONTRADICTORY DEVELOPMENTS
The rulings in Firestone, Hutchinson, and Wolston shattered previ-
ous conceptions of public figure law and left in their place new "stan-
dards" of such amorphous contour and indiscernible application that
a veritable Tower of Babel has been created in the lower courts. This
chaos in public figure law is now beginning to chip away at the edges
of public official law, an area that was thought to be comparatively
well-settled. Status determinations for public school teachers are prov-
ing to be the thin end of the chisel.
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the public of-
ficial status of teachers as defamation plaintiffs5 2 and what little case
law that has emanated from lower federal courts tends toward a some-
what perfunctory application of state court precedents.1 State courts
are deeply divided on the public official status of teachers. State su-
preme courts that have squarely faced the issue are split four-to-four
on the question; those holding that teachers are public officials in-
clude Arkansas, 4 Mississippi,55 Ohio,5 6 and Oklahoma;"7 those hold-
49. Dem., Wis.
50. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135.
51. Id.
52. In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the Supreme Court adopted
the New York Times standard to establish criteria for discharging a teacher who criticized his
superintendent and school board in a non-defamation case. This importation of a defamation
principle into the realm of employee rights could be construed as creating special status for
teachers that is not enjoyed by government employees generally. It might, therefore, be read as
conferring special status upon teachers in other contexts, perhaps in defamation actions. As yet
no case law exists to support such an extension of Pickering.
53. See, e.g., Stevens v. Tillman, 568 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Il. 1983), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1339 (1989) (cursory determination that a school principal is not a public official for purposes of
a defamation claim pendent to a federal civil rights action).
54. Gallman v. Carnes, 254 Ark. 987, 497 S.W.2d 47 (1973).
55. Reaves v. Foster, 200 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1967).
56. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
57. Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978).
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ing that teachers are not public officials are Florida," Maine,5 9
Virginia,60 and Wisconsin. 61
A. Teachers as Public Officials
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. News-Herald6 2 is
probably the most significant of those holding in favor of public offi-
cial status for teachers. Unfortunately, ascertaining the meaning of
the case is no easy task. Scott was one of two major libel actions aris-
ing from a sportswriter's criticism of the conduct of a school superin-
tendent and a wrestling coach in events surrounding a brawl at a high
school wrestling match. The writer accused the coach of inciting the
melee and stated that the coach and the superintendent had lied at
subsequent investigative proceedings .63
In the earlier of the two cases, Milkovich v. News-Herald,64 the
Ohio Supreme Court held that the critical article was not opinion and
that the coach was neither a public official nor a public figure. 65 The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari."6 In a dissent to the
denial of certiorari, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, ad-
vanced the position that public school teachers and coaches are public
officials as a matter of law. 67
Following an extraordinarily bitter election in which the role of the
press was controversial enough to provoke a libel suit by one of the
defeated judges," new judges assumed seats on the Ohio Supreme
Court. 69 This reconstituted court heard the second case, that of super-
intendent Scott. The text of Scott reflects the acrimony of the preced-
58. Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984).
59. True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986).
60. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 234 Va. 277, 362 S.E.2d 32 (1987), cert. de-
nied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988).
61. Ranous v. Hughes, 30 Wis. 2d 452, 141 N.W.2d 251 (1966). The current state of the law
is even less clear than the four-to-four split of state supreme courts indicates. For example, the
plaintiff in Gallman was an associate dean as well as a law professor; that administrative status
might have played an unacknowledged role in the Arkansas court's ruling. Also, Reaves and
Ranous were decided before much significant case law or scholarship had developed on public
official status and, further, the plaintiff in Reaves was a school principal.
62. 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
63. Id. at 277-78, 496 N.E.2d at 728-29.
64. 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984), cert. denied sub nom. Lorain Journal Co.
v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953 (1985), overruled, Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496
N.E.2d 699 (1986).
65. Id. at 297, 473 N.E.2d at 1195-97.
66. 474 U.S. 953 (1985).
67. Id. at 958.
68. See Courts Use Hustler to Kill Parody Claims, 12 NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW 38, 39
(1988).
69. See id.
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ing election. In a lengthy ruling with four separate opinions, some of
them characterized by caustic, intemperate personal attacks on fellow
justices, the court's new majority held the article was opinion and
overruled Milkovich .7
Although that conclusion could have disposed of the case, the court
opted to decide the public official question. Noting the superinten-
dent's position as the chief executive of the school system and the
public interest in evaluating his job performance, the court cited with
approval Justice Brennan's discussion of the public official status of
teachers in general and the public figure status of the coach with re-
gard to the controversy arising from the brawl. 7' The court held:
"Based upon these concerns we cannot, with reflection, be content to
rest on the standards related in [Milkovich]. Accordingly, we overrule
Milkovich in its restrictive view of public officials and hold a public
school superintendent is a public official for purposes of defamation
law.' '72
Nothing in Milkovich suggests that a superintendent is not a public
official. Rather, the court in Milkovich held that a coach lacked suffi-
cient governmental authority to qualify as a public official. 7 The
Scott court must, therefore, have meant to say that the "restrictive
view" it overruled concerned the status of coaches and other instruc-
tional personnel of public schools.
This decision is significant because it swims against the tide of con-
temporary jurisprudence in other state supreme courts, specifically the
courts in Florida, 74 Maine, 71 and Virginia 76 that have had the benefit
of an assessment of twenty years of chaotic case law on the subject.
Perhaps the greatest significance of the Ohio controversy is that it af-
forded Justice Brennan the opportunity to lament the misinterpreta-
tion of his opinion in Rosenblatt.77
While Ohio has been the most fractious arena for this issue, Illinois
has been the most multifarious. That state's supreme court has essen-
70. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 244, 496 N.E.2d at 701. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974), the United States Supreme Court held that statements of opinion may
not be the subject of libel suits.
71. Id. at 247-48, 496 N.E. 2d at 703-04.
72. Id. at 247-48, 496 N.E.2d at 704.
73. Milkovich, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 297, 473 N.E.2d at 1195-97.
74. Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984).
75. True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986).
76. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 234 Va. 277, 362 S.E.2d 32 (1987), cert. de-
nied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988).
77. See Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 247, 496 N.E.2d at 703-04; see also infra notes 248-51 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan's opinion).
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tially ducked the issue 78 while the lower appellate courts have rendered
important and contradictory decisions that must be taken into account
for the extent to which they have influenced other state courts, includ-
ing state supreme courts.79
In Basarich v. Rodeghero0 an Illinois appellate court established
some of the theoretical groundwork for finding teachers to be public
officials. Noting that certain teachers and coaches who claimed to
have been defamed in an anti-union newsletter were public employees
paid with public funds, the court discussed the responsible positions
held by educators and the state constitution's recognition of education
as a prime governmental responsibility. The school system, its aca-
demic and athletic programs, and those who run them are "consistent
subjects of intense public interest and substantial publicity." 81 The
court concluded: "Public school teachers and coaches, and the con-
duct of such teachers and coaches and their policies, are of as much
concern to the community as are other 'public officials' and 'public
figures."' 8 The reference to public figures, in context, appears to be
no more than an offhand bit of surplusage in light of the language
about prime governmental responsibility, public funds, and the
unique public interest in discussion of education. This reference never-
theless became a focal point of analysis for courts inclined to reach a
different result, both in Illinois 3 and elsewhere. s4
Only a few months later, in Johnson v. Board of Junior College
District No. 508, a court of equal rank in a different Illinois jurisdic-
tion purported to follow Basarich, even while declaring that public
school teachers are not public officials as a matter of law.8 5 That court
somehow read Basarich as a public figure case, though that case
rested on status rather than conduct, and held that its plaintiffs were
"not distinguishable" from junior college professors involved in a ra-
cial controversy. 6 It is unclear why the Johnson court, after imposing
an actual malice standard based on narrow vortex public figure
grounds, 7 saw fit to reach the public official question when its conclu-
sion entailed such an implausible interpretation of Basarich.
78. See Colson v. Stieg, 89 Ill. 2d 205, 433 N.E.2d 246 (1982).
79. See infra notes 85, 92, 98-105 and accompanying text.
80. 24 Il1. App. 3d 889, 321 N.E.2d 739 (1974).
81. Id. at 892, 321 N.E.2d at 742.
82. Id.
83. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
85. 31 111. App. 3d 270, 334 N.E.2d 442 (1975).
86. Id. at 276, 334 N.E.2d at 447.
87. Id.
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The Johnson court's public figure holding proved to be an interme-
diate step in the regression from public official to private figure status
for public school teachers. The regression was completed in Mc-
Cutcheon v. Moran.88 In McCutcheon the court declared a teaching
principal to be a private figure for purposes of her defamation action
against a school janitor who accused her of kicking him in the but-
tocks. Adopting a California court's89 perception of New York Times
as standing for the "freedom of the governed to question the gover-
nor," 9 the McCutcheon court found that "the relationship a public
school teacher or principal has with the conduct of government is far
too remote, in our minds, to justify exposing these individuals to a
qualifiedly privileged assault upon his or her reputation."91 The court
identified Basarich as a "public figure" case and briefly summarized
it,92 but made no effort to harmonize or distinguish it. The court dis-
tinguished Johnson, a public figure case, on the basis of the absence
of a public controversy in the case at hand. 93
Some evidence that McCutcheon is now the preferred authority in
Illinois appears in the federal case Stevens v. Tillman,94 wherein the
judge, relying wholly on McCutcheon, held a school principal to be a
private figure. 95 The Illinois Supreme Court, perhaps finding discre-
tion the better part of valor, sidestepped an opportunity to resolve the
conflict in Colson v. Stieg.96 In a Solomonic ruling, the justices de-
clined to reach the broader status question and, for the limited pur-
pose of tenure decisions within a school, added an actual malice
standard to the state's common law special interest privilege, provided
publication does not extend beyond those with an interest and concern
in the matter. 97 The Illinois situation warrants notice not only because
Basarich and McCutcheon have been persuasive in other jurisdictions,
but also because Illinois law is a microcosm of the confusion and er-
ror that characterize American defamation law regarding public
school teachers.
Perhaps the most straightforward and unambiguous finding of
teachers as public officials by a state supreme court emerged from
88. 99 111. App. 3d 421, 425 N.E.2d 1130 (1981).
89. Franklin v. Lodge 1108, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915,
159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979).
90. Id. at 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
91. McCutcheon, 99 111. App. 3d at 424, 425 N.E.2d at 1133.
92. Id. at 423,425 N.E.2d at 1132.
93. Id.
94. 568 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Il1. 1983), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1339 (1989).
95. Id. at 294.
96. 89 I11. 2d 205, 433 N.E.2d 246 (1982).
97. Id. at 213, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
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Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp.9 Relying largely on the Bas-
arich court's reading of Rosenblatt, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
found education an "obvious governmental function" under the state
constitution, and added: "[W]e can think of no higher community in-
volvement touching more families and carrying more public interest
than the public school system. This includes the athletic program.' 99
The Oklahoma court essentially repeated the reasoning of Basarich,
focusing on the state constitution and the discussion of the impor-
tance of public school teachers in a free society. But in doing so the
court studiedly omitted the superfluous reference to "public fig-
ures."' l° By this means the court perhaps sought to spare its ruling
from the fate of Basarich by closing the main avenue through which
other judges might seek to escape Johnston's stricture while citing it
approvingly. If such a strategy entered into the court's drafting, its
apparent success was perhaps manifested in Luper v. Black Dispatch
Publishing Co.10 In Luper an Oklahoma appellate court, with harsh
criticism of the state of defamation law as applied to public officials
wrongly accused of crime, 1°2 conformed to the Johnston public offi-
cial ruling, though a public figure holding also appears in its opin-
ion. 103
Just a month before Johnston, an Arizona appellate court arrived
at the same conclusion in what stands as that state's leading case on
the status of teachers as defamation plaintiffs-Sewell v. Brook-
bank.'°4 Considering the complaint of a high school chemistry teacher
accused of incompetence by a group of parents, the court rendered a
sweeping declaration: "As far as the law of defamation is concerned,
teachers are 'public officials." ' 15 Other than a citation to Basarich,
the court offered no further discussion of the question.
B. Teachers as Private Figures
The first shot in the counterrevolution was fired in Poe v. San An-
tonio Express-News Corp., a Texas ruling bestowing private figure
status on a high school teacher accused of sexually fondling a four-
98. 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978). Johnston involved another wrestling coach who was ac-
cused of forcing a sixth grader to crawl naked through the legs of his teammates while they beat
him.
99. Id. at 1103
100. Id.
101. 675 P.2d 1028 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983).
102. Id. at 1032 n.2
103. Id. at 1031.
104. 119 Ariz. 422, 581 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1978).
105. Id. at 425, 581 P.2d at 270.
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teen-year-old girl in a classroom after school.°0 In Poe the court made
some highly aberrational interpretations of federal constitutional def-
amation law. The court read Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. as modify-
ing previous holdings of the United States Supreme Court on
characteristics of public officials as well as public figures.107 The court
perceived Hutchinson v. Proxmire'0 s and Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Association, Inc.1'9 as exemplifying recent trends to modify "the rigid
rules as to what constitutes a 'public official' or 'public figure' in def-
amation suits against the news media." 10 In fact, neither of these
public figure rulings purported to affect public official determinations
and Hutchinson did not involve a news medium as a party."' The Poe
court did not even mention Rosenblatt, the controlling authority for
public official determinations. 112 Most startling of all, the court
opined that even an elected official can be a private figure for defama-
tion purposes." 3 These conclusions have provoked some scornful
commentary,"14 and other courts reaching like results have taken care
to cite Poe for its holding alone without reference to its reasoning. '"
In fairness to the Poe court, it should be said that the notion of an
elected official being a private figure was imposed upon it by the
Texas Supreme Court in Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc.116 After
the lower court in Foster, the same court which later decided Poe,
held an elected county surveyor to be a public official, 117 the Texas
Supreme Court reversed. 118 The Foster ruling is contrary to the United
States Supreme Court decisions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"19
Garrison v. Louisiana,120 Rosenblatt v. Baer,12 1 Monitor Patriot Co. v.
106. 590 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979).
107. Id. at 539.
108. 443 U.S. 111 (1979). For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes
49-51.
109. 443 U.S. 157 (1979). For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes
47-48.
110. Poe, 590 S.W.2d at 541 n.3.
111. See supra notes 49-51.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 240-43 (discussing the Rosenblatt criteria).
113. Poe, 590 S.W.2d at 541.
114. See, e.g., B. SANFORD, supra note 3, at 218-19.
115. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 234 Va. 277, 362 S.E.2d 32 (1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988); True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986).
116. 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
117. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc. 530 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
118. Foster, 541 S.W.2d at 809.
119. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
120. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
121. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
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Roy, 22 and Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 23 and appears to be
the only post-New York Times ruling holding an elected official to be
a private person. Nevertheless, following the denial of certiorari by
the United States Supreme Court, 24 the lower Texas courts have little
choice but to follow Foster. 25
A scant few weeks after Poe, and without reference to it, a Califor-
nia appellate court handed down the case that forms the basis of the
doctrine that teachers are not public officials: Franklin v. Lodge 1108,
Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks. 26 Noting its disagreement 127
with the Oklahoma court in Johnston and the Illinois court in Basar-
ich, the California court concluded: "The governance or control
which a public classroom teacher might be said to exercise over the
conduct of government is at most remote and philosophical. Far too
much so, in our view, to justify exposing each classroom teacher to a
qualifiedly privileged assault on his or her reputation."'2 8 The court
preceded that conclusion with this remarkable passage:
Respondents urge that a public high school teacher necessarily
occupies a position which, independent of particular issues, "would
invite public scrutiny and discussion." This may well be so. But it
does not necessarily follow that a public high school teacher is
therefore a public official .... Implicit in the reasoning of New
York Times and of Rosenblatt is the concept of a freedom of the
governed to question the governor, of those who are influenced by
the operation of government to criticize those who control the
conduct of government.129
122. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
123. 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
124. 429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
125. The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that Foster would be a public official for pur-
poses of commentary related to his elected post as county surveyor. Foster, 541 S.W.2d at 814-
15. The court placed great emphasis on the fact that the elected office had few duties and no
salary. Foster also frequently contracted with the county government as a consulting engineer. In
that latter capacity, a controversy arose over drainage problems on land he was alleged to have
platted. The court found this controversy irrelevant to Foster's performance in his official posi-
tion, though it would not seem to require a great leap of imagination to see how an alleged
blunder in platting land might touch on one's fitness as a county surveyor, as three dissenting
judges pointed out. Id. at 820-21 (Pope, J., dissenting).
Because the case was remanded for trial, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari
for lack of a final judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982). The Texas court had
previously established public figure status for a professor who led anti-war demonstrations, but
that is perhaps too obvious and unrelated a determination to be relevant to Poe. See El Paso
Times v. Trexler, 447 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. 1969).
126. 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979).
127. Id. at 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
128. Id. at 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
129. Id. (emphasis in original).
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A sort of judicial-shell game is operating here in which an "im-
plicit" standard of "control of the conduct of government" is torn
from its qualifying context and smuggled in to override the explicit
Rosenblatt criterion of independent public interest in the position
without regard to actual authority or control. 30 The Illinois Court in
McCutcheon v. Moran3' cited and incorporated this gambit, which
has also been an appreciable force, directly and indirectly, in other
cases. 32 In Franklin, for example, the court articulated a theory that
teachers are entitled to some sort of special role as defamation plain-
tiffs to preserve academic freedom: "We are unwilling to hold that a
school teacher must be deemed to have assumed the risk of nonmali-
cious defamation. We perceive in such a rule a real and intolerable
danger to the freedom of intellect and of expression which the teacher
must have to teach effectively."'3 In other words, teachers should be
exempt from proving actual malice not because they do not occupy a
unique position among government employees, but because they do!
Rosenblatt is turned on its head.
In Foote v. Sarafyan3 4 a Louisiana appeals court perhaps exceeded
that misreading of a United States Supreme Court case in its finding
that a department chairman and two professors at a state university
were private figures. Consider this holding:
Hutchinson v. Proxmire held that a state university adjunct
professor who was also director of research at a state hospital and
who had received $500,000 in federal research grants was not, not
even in respect to his federally-supported research, a public official
within New York Times v. Sullivan .... We therefore conclude that
our plaintiffs are not limited by the actual malice test of
Sullivan .... '3I
Now compare the actual language of Hutchinson: "The District Court
also concluded that Hutchinson was a public official. . . .The Court
of Appeals did not decide whether that conclusion was correct. We
therefore express no opinion on the issue." 136
130. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85-87 (1966); infra text accompanying notes 240-
43.
131. 99 I11. App. 3d 421, 424, 425 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (1981); see supra text accompanying
notes 88-93.
132. It was especially influential in True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257, 264 (Me. 1986). See infra
text accompanying notes 153-59.
133. Franklin, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
134. 432 So. 2d 877 (La. App. Ct. 1982).
135. Id. at 880 (citations omitted).
136. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979) (citations omitted).
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This is merely a more stark presentation of the same error that ap-
peared in Poe.' One might expect this sort of mistake to be exceed-
ingly rare in appellate opinions, but a closer examination of the cases
in this area discloses that accurate reading and application of the con-
trolling law is the exception rather than the rule.
As recently as 1985 and 1986 when Bruce Sanford 3 8 and Rodney
Smolla'3 9 published the two major modern treatises of defamation
law, something approaching a scholarly consensus' 40 existed for the
proposition that teachers were public officials as a matter of law.
Writing in 1985, Sanford could state accurately that "the overwhelm-
ing weight of authority thus holds public educators to the Sullivan
standard.' 14' Today that conclusion is no longer true. Four major
subsequent cases have been decided, by a 3-1 margin, in favor of
teachers being private persons. The lone exception is the Ohio case,
Scott v. News-Herald. 42 A mutually reinforcing modern trilogy of
Nodar v. Galbreath,143 True v. Ladner,"" and Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Lipscomb, 45 from the supreme courts of Florida, Maine, and
Virginia, respectively, have, at the very least, evened the score.
In Nodar, the Florida Supreme Court established private figure
status for a teacher who was criticized by a parent at a school board
meeting for alleged incompetence.' The court was unimpressed with
contrary conclusions from other jurisdictions: "Petitioner has not
cited any binding authority for the proposition that the plaintiff here
was a public official. It is enough to say that we decline to so charac-
terize a public high school English teacher."
47
The court's reasoning may not be as inaccessible as that holding
suggests. An unmistakable aroma of public figure analysis permeated
this public official inquiry, as when the court, acknowledging the dif-
ference but glossing over it, cited to Gertz after arguing that becoming
a teacher does not entail as much assumption of risk as accepting an
elected or policymaking position.14 This assumption of risk analysis is
137. See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
138. See B. SpAoRD, supra note 3, at 216.
139. See R. SmOLLA, supra note 3, at 2-92.
140. See also L. TrIBE, supra note 2, at 866 (the public official-designation "now embraces
virtually all persons affiliated with the government, such as most ordinary civil servants, includ-
ing public school teachers and policemen").
141. B. SANIoRD, supra note 3, at 216 (citations omitted).
142. 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986); see supra text accompanying notes 62-70.
143. 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984).
144. 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986).
145. 234 Va. 277, 362 S.E.2d 32 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988).
146. Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 808.
147. Id. (footnote omitted).
148. Id.
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misplaced in a public official inquiry, in which the importance of the
position, actual or perceived, is the determinant-without regard to
the volition, attitude, or conduct of the occupant of the post. The
court justified its analytic conflation of two distinct categories by stat-
ing that "both serve the same purpose of preserving a free press.'' 149
The justices closed this specious circle with the triumphant observa-
tion that Elmer Gertz was found to be a private figure despite his in-
volvement in a well-publicized case." 0
Having decided a public official question on public figure grounds
without reference to the importance of the public interest in the job,
the Florida Supreme Court shifted back into public official law to dis-
tinguish, on the ground of differences in underlying reasoning, its
finding that a police officer was a public official in Smith v. Russell.5'
According to the court in Smith, a police officer is a "highly visible
representative of government authority who has power over citizens
and broad discretion in the exercise of that power."1 52
The Florida Supreme Court's status differentiation between teach-
ers and police officers was cited and adopted by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine in True v. Ladner,' which is the piece de resistance
of the doctrine that teachers are private figures. It stands head and
shoulders above the rest in the depth and scope of its analysis and the
extent to which its flawed rationale is revealed.
True leans heavily on the doctrine of Franklin v. Lodge 1108, Be-
nevolent & Protective Order of Elks:' 4 "The governance or control
which a public classroom teacher might be said to exercise over the
conduct of government is at most remote and philosophical." 55 How-
ever, the Maine court added a new wrinkle to the Franklin line of
reasoning. Having previously found police officers to be public offi-
cials in Roche v. Egan,'5 6 the court distinguished them from teachers
on the following grounds: law enforcement is a "uniquely govern-
mental affair," while education is both public and private; police offi-
cers have round-the-clock authority over an entire jurisdiction while
teachers have authority only at school during working hours; police
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 456 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1984).
152. Id. at 464.
153. 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986).
154. 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979); see supra text accompanying notes 126-
30.
155. True, 513 A.2d at 263-64 (quoting Franklin, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. at
136). For a critique of this proposition with regard to the importance of teachers in relation to
other government employees, see infra notes 247-60 and accompanying text.
156. 433 A.2d 757 (Me. 1981).
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officers have broader authority and firearms to enforce it; and police
officers have authority over both adults and children.15 7
Though all these are accurate descriptions of the different roles of
teachers and police officers, they have limited utility as definitional
criteria. One might say with equal irrelevance that teachers generally
get summers off and police officers do not. Many public officials per-
form duties that are not uniquely governmental in the sense that simi-
lar jobs exist in the private sector. Governmental utilities, hospitals,
museums, libraries, liquor stores, and recreational facilities all have
their private counterparts. An important governmental employee is no
less important for performing a job which is performed by private
employees as well. Many public officials are on duty only certain parts
of the day and exert authority only at the office. Few of them are
armed. Many have authority over only a limited number of indivi-
duals. Nothing in the pertinent body of law indicates that control over
children is inherently less important than control over adults, and fur-
thermore, many teachers are involved in various kinds of adult educa-
tion.
Undoubtedly, the presence of the factors the court adduced contrib-
uted to the designation of police officers as public officials because
they give the public "an independent interest in the qualifications and
performance of the person who holds" the position, beyond the gen-
eral interest in governmental employees as a class. 5 8 However, the ab-
sence of these factors is in no way dispositive because different
positions command special interest for different reasons. To reach the
conclusion it did, the Maine Supreme Court's proper burden was to
show that no independent public interest existed in the work of teach-
ers beyond the interest in the work of ordinary, run-of-the-mill gov-
ernment employees, and that teachers lacked substantial responsibility
for or control over governmental affairs, or even the appearance of
such responsibility or control.5 9 The Maine court completely avoided
this inquiry.
The Maine Supreme Court took note of contrary rulings by the Ari-
zona court in Sewell v. Brookbank'60 and the Oklahoma court in
Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp.'61 The court called these
cases into question for their reliance on the Illinois court's decision in
Basarich v. Rodeghero.162 The Maine court asserted that the Basarich
157. True, 513 A.2d at 264.
158. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85-86 (1966).
159. See id.
160. 119 Ariz. 422, 581 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1978).
161. 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978).
162. 24 I11. App. 3d 889, 321 N.E.2d 739 (1974).
1990]
780 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:761
court "held that public high school teachers were 'public officials' or
'public figures,' and thus collapsed and confused the criteria for de-
termining plaintiff's status."' 63 This criticism relies on simple misquo-
tation, and the offending word is the one the Maine court saw fit to
emphasize with italics. The pertinent language in Basarich is: "Public
school teachers and coaches ... are of as much concern to the com-
munity as are other 'public officials' and 'public figures." ' 64 The
Maine court's misreading is a variant of the misreadings in Johnson
and McCutcheon.'65 The quoted language can hardly be read as con-
flating the public official and public figure categories, especially in
light of the immediately preceding analysis which rested its conclusion
exclusively on government emplqyment in responsible positions and
the role of education as a prime governmental responsibility in the
Illinois constitution.'6
Ironically, the Maine court itself has collapsed and confused the
public official and public figure categories. Its holding is based in sig-
nificant part on public figure principles of assumption of risk and ac-
cess to counter-speech derived from Gertz.'67 Woven into this logic is
an argument borrowed from Franklin that the academic freedom of
teachers is chilled by the fear of having to prove actual malice if they
are defamed.161
The last of the modern trilogy of cases finding teachers to be pri-
vate figures is the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court in Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb.' 69 This case is perhaps most
remarkable for the fact that it was decided after the Ohio cases Mil-
kovich v. News-Herald 170 and Scott v. News-Herald171 were reported,
but still made no reference to them other than a bare mention in a
string citation. 172 Justice Brennan's dissent from denial of certiorari in
Milkovich'" is by far the most forceful and articulate expression of
the public official status of teachers. The dissent was a major factor in
163. True, 513 A.2d at 265-66 n.8 (emphasis in original).
164. Basarich, 24 Ill. App. 3d at 892, 321 N.E.2d at 742 (emphasis supplied).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 85-93.
166. True, 513 A.2d at 265-66 n.8.
167. See infra text accompanying notes 190-204.
168. True, 513 A.2d at 264; see infra text accompanying notes 190-217 and 261-67 (criticizing
the Gertz and Franklin approaches).
169. 234 Va. 277, 362 S.E.2d 32 (Va. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988).
170. 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984), cert. denied sub. nom. Lorain Journal Co.
v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953 (1985), rev'd, Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E. 2d
699 (1986).
171. 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
172. See Lipscomb, 234 Va. at 288 n.3, 362 S.E.2d at 36-37 n.3.
173. 474 U.S. 953 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the Scott court's decision to overturn Milkovich.7 4 One would be hard
pressed to maintain a contrary position without rebuttal of its princi-
pal points. ,75
The Virginia court, however, chose instead to plow the well-worn
furrows of public figure law in deciding a public official case. A high
school teacher and English Department head was held to be a private
person based on the now familiar Gertz principles of risk assumption
and access to means of effective counter-speech. 7 6 In Lipscomb, how-
ever, the court trespassed even more deeply into public figure law by
giving weight to the fact that the plaintiff made no attempt to control
school policy. 177 This, of course, disregards the rule that public offi-
cial determinations are to be based on position alone, not on individ-
ual conduct.178
Recognizing a state statute mandating confidentiality of student re-
cords, the court concluded that the teacher probably lacked access to
counter-speech, that is, the teacher could not have fully answered the
charges against her without violating that statute. 179 Needless to say,
such a consideration constitutes another departure from the "position
alone" determinant of public official status. Any consideration of the
individual circumstances of a plaintiff is, ipso facto, an excursion into
public figure law-an improper inquiry in public official cases.
Judges, police officers, child-abuse workers, and military officers, to
name but a few, are forbidden by law from disclosing certain infor-
mation that could enhance their reputations at times when they might
be under attack. They are no less public officials for that circum-
stance.
III. SORTING IT OUT
Part of the confusion in public official defamation law stems from
the fact that judges vary in their willingness to establish new prece-
dent. Ruling for a libel defendant on common law grounds allows a
judge to avoid making a constitutional decision.' 80 Moreover, public
174. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 247, 496 N.E.2d at 703.
175. For a discussion of Justice Brennan's argument, see infra text accompanying notes 248-
54.
176. Lipscomb, 234 Va. at 288, 362 S.E.2d at 37.
177. Id. at 286, 362 S.E.2d at 37.
178. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86-87 n.13 (1966).
179. Lipscomb, 234 Va. at 285, 362 S.E.2d at 36.
180. The common law privilege for comment on teachers is a substantial body of law in its
own right and is beyond the scope of this inquiry. See generally Annotation, Libel and Slander:
Actionability of Statements Imputing Inefficiency or Lack of Qualification to Public School
Teacher, 40 A.L.R. 3d 490 (1968 & 1989 Supps.).
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figure determinations, though constitutional, are often fact-specific
inquiries that will not bind future cases. By contrast, a public official
determination sets precedent for all future cases within a given occu-
pation. This distinction sheds light on the reluctance of some judges
to reach the public official question when an alternative disposition is
available. Nevertheless, many other judges have made public official
determinations which were not necessary to decide the cases before
them.
An examination of thirty-eight defamation cases in which educators
were plaintiffs yields a seemingly bewildering cacophony of results
with regard to status determinations. Teachers have been classified as
public officials, public figures, and private persons by various courts,
with no apparent consistency of result emerging from similar fact pat-
terns. Separating the college faculty from the elementary and second-
ary school teachers continues to show inconsistent results within each
group.' 8' The outcomes are somewhat more uniform in the cases deal-
ing with administrators.'82 Isolating coaches from classroom teachers
makes a difference, but some of those cases are clouded by public
figure questions involving persons of nationwide fame." 3
The one variable that makes the most difference is the date of the
court's decision. Leaving aside the 1966 decision in Ranous v.
Hughes,'84 in which the defendants apparently did not raise the public
official question, a distinct pattern can be discerned. From 1967 to
1978, the courts found educator plaintiffs to be public officials or
public figures in every reported appellate case in which the issue was
decided. However, beginning in 1979 and continuing through 1987, a
dramatic change occurred-private figure denominations became the
rule rather than the exception for all educational personnel except
high-level administrators."85
It is no accident that this shift in results coincides with the United
States Supreme Court's pronounced contraction of public figure law in
Hutchinson v. Proxmire6 and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Associa-
tion.17 A content analysis of the teacher cases tends to confirm that sus-
181. See Appendix infra page 798.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 30 Wis. 2d 452, 141 N.W.2d 251 (1966). The defendant school board chairman was
aware of New York Times and Rosenblatt. Inexplicably, he attempted to enlist these cases in
support of an argument that his comments were privileged because he was a public official.
While that argument may have force in some jurisdictions, these are not the cases which support
it.
185. See Appendix infra page 798.
186. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
187. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
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picion. Beginning with Poe v. San Antonio Express-News Corp."'8 and
Franklin v. Lodge 1108, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks'8 9 in
1979, and continuing through Lipscomb in 1987, constricted concepts
from public figure law lay over public official determinations like a
ghostly template. Even though the Supreme Court itself never retreated
from a more expansive view of public officials, the spirit of its pro-plain-
tiff thrust in public figure law filtered down to the lower courts and
crossed over into public official questions.
Although the Supreme Court's contraction of public figure designa-
tions began in 1974 in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' 90 and gathered steam
in 1976 in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,9' it did not intrude into public official
law in other courts until reaching full throttle in Hutchinson and Wol-
ston in 1979.
Exegesis of the cases explains this lag. Virtually every case denominat-
ing a teacher a private person has employed the assumption of risk and
access to media principles originally articulated in Gertz. Prior to 1979,
however, these principles were understood to serve a very different pur-
pose. They emerged in Gertz as a rationale for discarding the Rosen-
bloom test of issues of "public or general interest" as a trigger of the
actual malice standard.'92 Receding from a landmark decision like Rosen-
bloom called for an explanation. The explanation offered by the Su-
preme Court in Gertz focused on the plaintiff rather than on the issue
because of the differential in ability among plaintiffs to withstand the
ravages of defamation. The Gertz majority advanced the belief that most
public persons are more likely to have access to means of rebuttal and
are more likely to have voluntarily accepted the possibility of defamatory
criticism through their efforts to engage public attention. These charac-
teristics were offered as the reason for having a distinction between pub-
lic and private persons, not as the definitional criteria for making the
distinction. ,93
Nothing in Gertz contradicts this assessment and much supports it. At
the end of its discussion of risk assumption and access to counter-speech,
the Court made clear that these are reasons for having criteria rather
than the criteria themselves: "For these reasons we conclude that the
States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal
remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private
188. 590 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979).
189. 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979).
190. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
191. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
192. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-46.
193. Id.
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individual."' 194 Other passages in the text indicated that the two-fold ra-
tionale separating public from private plaintiffs was not to be read as
creating definitional elements. The Court introduced the discussion by
stating: "Thus it is often true that not all of the considerations which
justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each particular case decided
under its authority."'9
Superior access to media by public persons cannot define the category,
for, as the Court recognized, it exists only "usually."'9 In a key sentence
the Court reasoned: "Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in
every instance, the communications media are entitled to act on the as-
sumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed
themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood con-
cerning them." 197 This statement presupposes an independent and pre-
existing conception of public persons that takes no account of access to
media or actual assumption of risk-the conception outlined in Rosen-
blatt,19 in Butts/Walker,'99 and elsewhere in Gertz itself." Finally, the
Gertz majority allowed for the possibility of involuntary public figures,2'
a possibility that would be foreclosed if media access and risk assump-
tion were to be defining elements. Clearly, the Court intended to allow
for public figures and, a fortiori, public officials who have assumed no
risk and lack media access.
At that stage in the development of the law, the conception of "public
figure" was more expansive. Public figures were those who "have as-
sumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society.'"' They
were said to attain this status either by gaining "pervasive fame or noto-
riety" or by attempting to influence the resolution of issues in a particu-
lar controversy; either way, such persons assume "special prominence in
the resolution of public questions.''01 Gertz chose to associate himself
with a case sure to be in the spotlight and he almost certainly could have
had media access if he had wanted it. These facts, however, were insuffi-
cient to make him a public figure.2
194. Id. at 345 (emphasis supplied).
195. Id. at 344.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 345.
198. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
199. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388
U.S. 130 (1967) (decided with Butts in joint opinion).
200. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
201. Id. at 345. Involuntary public figures were described as being "exceedingly rare." Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 351.
204. Id. at 352.
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Media access and risk assumption also played no role in the Court's
classifying the plaintiff in Firestone as a private person. Indeed, if they
had, a different outcome would have been virtually inevitable. Mary Al-
ice Firestone's purely voluntary press conferences attracted prodigious
media attention. She created opportunities to communicate her side of
the divorce and used them quite effectively. 21
Not until Hutchinson and Wolston did the reasons for forging a di-
chotomy between public and private figures blend into the standards for
drawing the distinction. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall,
posed the matter starkly:
First, a lapse of years between a controversial event and a libelous
utterance may diminish the defamed party's access to the means of
counterargument. At the height of the publicity surrounding the
espionage controversy here, petitioner may well have had sufficient
access to the media to effectively rebut a charge that he was a Soviet
spy. It would strain credulity to suggest that petitioner could have
commanded such media interest when respondents published their book
in 1974. Second, the passage of time may diminish the "risk of public
scrutiny" that a putative public figure may fairly be said to have
assumed."
Similarly in Hutchinson, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the major-
ity, seemed to classify media access among the identifying characteristics
of public figures:
Finally, we cannot agree that Hutchinson had such access to the
media that he should be classified as a public figure. Hutchinson's
access was limited to responding to the announcement of the Golden
Fleece Award. He did not have the regular and continuing access to the
media that is one of the accouterments of having become a public
figure. W
The degree to which Hutchinson and Wolston collapsed the reason for
defining "public figure" into the definition itself is in no small part re-
sponsible for the swirling maelstrom of confusion on this point that per-
sists to this day in the lower courts."
205. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 485-87 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
206. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 170-71 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
207. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 136 (1979).
208. The misapplication of public figure law principles may also be disordering public offi-
cial determinations for other occupational categories. Compare Sellars v. Stauffer Communica-
tions, Inc., 9 Kan. App. 2d 573, 684 P.2d 450 (1984), aff'd, 236 Kan. 697, 695 P.2d 812 (1985)
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This phenomenon percolated down into the lower courts' considera-
tion of public official issues in an uneven and inconsistent fashion. The
status of police officers, for example, was not affected for the simple
reason that law enforcement officers had brought so many suits in so
many jurisdictions that they had been firmly established as public offi-
cials before Hutchinson and Wolston were decided.209 By contrast, only a
few teacher cases had produced appellate opinions by 1978.210 These early
decisions primarily designated educators as public officials, but some
(where a file clerk in a sheriff's office who married the sheriff was not considered a public
official) with Auvil v. Times Journal Co., 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2302 (E.D. Va. 1984) (where
a receptionist at an army pediatric clinic was declared a public official).
The families and associates of political candidates partake of the candidate's public official
status in inconsistent and unpredictable ways. See Lawrence v. Moss, 639 F.2d 634 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031 (1981) (administrative aide in United States Senate campaign and
former aide to Vice President Agnew declared a private figure); News-Journal Co. v. Gallagher,
233 A.2d 166 (Del. 1967) (chairman of local Republican committee treated as public official);
Hemenway v. Blanchard, 163 Ga. App. 668, 294 S.E.2d 603 (1982) (spouse of congressional
candidate declared a public person); Lewis v. Vallis, 356 Mass. 662, 255 N.E.2d 337 (1970)
(mayoral candidate's campaign manager held a private figure); Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 A.D.2d 517,
251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 1023, 207 N.E.2d 620, 260 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1965) (may-
oral candidate's law partner held a public person).
While grand jurors have been declared public officials, see Standke v. B.E. Darby & Sons, 291
Minn. 468, 193 N.W.2d 139 (1971), cert. dismissed, 406 U.S. 902 (1972), petit jurors have been
considered private figures, see Macon Telegraph Publishing Co. v. Elliott, 165 Ga. App. 719,
302 S.E.2d 692, cert. granted and vacated, 251 Ga. 544, 309 S.E.2d 142 (1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S 971 (1984).
For a discussion of apparently inconsistent public official determinations in various other oc-
cupational categories, see generally: Arctic Co. v. Loudoun Times Mirror, 624 F.2d 518 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981) (government contractor conducting environmental and
archaeological research); Kassel v. Gannett Co., 15 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 1702 (D.N.H. 1988)
(Veterans Administration clinical psychologist); Adey v. United Action for Animals, Inc., 361 F.
Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd mem., 493 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842
(1974) (government contractor who experimented with monkeys); Peoples v. Tautfest, 274 Cal.
App. 2d 630, 79 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1969) (city recreation director); Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican
Publishing Co., 637 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1981) (ski program director for county recreation); Fopay
v. Noveroske, 31 111. App. 3d 182, 334 N.E.2d 79 (1975) (X-ray technician in county hospital);
Turley v. WTAX, Inc., 94 Ill. App. 2d 377, 236 N.E.2d 778 (1968) (government contracted
architect/engineer); Blessum v. Howard County Board of Supervisors, 295 N.W.2d 836 (Iowa
1980) (county-employed engineer); Vigoda v. Barton, 348 Mass. 478, 204 N.E.2d 441 (1965)
(psychiatric social worker); Stephens v. Dixon, 30 Md. App. 56, 351 A.2d 187 (1976) (federal
government engineer); Nuyen v. Slater, 372 Mich. 654, 127 N.W.2d 369 (1964) (public health
nurse); Hodgins v. Times Herald Co., 169 Mich. App. 245, 425 N.W.2d 522 (1988) (county
contracted kennel operator who provided dogs for research); Mauch, Stastny, & Rassan, P.A. v.
Bicknell, 95 N.M. 702, 625 P.2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1980) (government contracted architect); Foster
v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977)
(government contracted engineer).
209. See generally Annotation, Libel and Slander: Who is a Public Official or Otherwise
Within the Federal Constitutional Rule Requiring Public Officials to Show Actual Malice, 19
A.L.R. 3d 1361 (1968 & 1989 Supps.). One of the better analyses of the police cases may be
found in Roche v. Egan, 433 A.2d 757 (Me. 1981).
210. See Appendix infra page 798.
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courts opted for a public figure theory and at least one rested on the
subsequently revoked Rosenbloom standards.2 ' Most courts that gave
reasons for classifying teachers as private persons after 1978 found stan-
dards from Gertz, Hutchinson, and Wolston applicable to the public of-
ficial inquiry. 212 This misapplication of public figure theory accelerated as
successive courts incorporated the errors of their predecessors.
To be sure, Gertz decided some public official questions: that there is
no such thing as a "de facto public official," that a lawyer is not a pub-
lic official merely by virtue of being an officer of the court, and that
unpaid past service on city advisory committees does not rise to the level
of public official status .21 None of these rulings, however, has any bear-
ing on public school teachers.
The Gertz Court twice used the words "public officials and public fig-
ures" in its discussion of risk assumption and media access. 214 This lan-
guage is commonly seized upon by state courts wishing to declare
teachers private figures on grounds of lacking media access and not hav-
ing assumed the risk. The Virginia Supreme Court even went so far as to
omit the words "public figures" from the quotation with a three-dot el-
lipsis, making the entire passage appear to be a public official discus-
sion. 215 This sort of interpretation is misdirected. The dicta about risk
assumption and media access did not, at the time of Gertz, even enter
into the definition of "public figure," let alone the definition of "public
official." Application of these concepts to public officialdom would nec-
essarily mean that the Gertz Court intended to modify not only Rosen-
bloom, but New York Times and Rosenblatt as well. This would be a
major development indeed; the Texas court in Poe actually carried mat-
ters to this startling conclusion, 21 6 though other courts stopped short of
it. One might reasonably expect that if the Gertz Court had intended a
retooling of the rationale for treating public officials differently, it would
have found room for a reference to the inconsistency of seditious libel
with the first amendment. That, after all, was and is the foundation of
public official defamation law. 217
Some of the practical inconsistencies are remarkable to behold. The
Maine Supreme Court, for example, relied heavily on risk assumption
211. Id.
212. See supra notes 106-79 and accompanying text.
213. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
214. Id. at 344-45.
215. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 234 Va. 277, 284, 362 S.E.2d 32, 35
(1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988).
216. Poe v. San Antonio Express-News Corp., 590 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979);
see supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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and media access in excluding teachers from the public official category
in True.21 1 Yet when it undertook the same inquiry with opposite results
for police officers in Roche,2 19 it offered not even a nod in the direction
of these factors. The same inconsistent approach is found in the Florida
cases Nodar v. Galbreath,220 involving a teacher, and Smith v. Russell,21
involving a police officer, and is also found in a line of cases encompass-
ing virtually every state that has refused to call a teacher a public offi-
cial.m2 These factors are either elements of public official status or they
are not. They cannot be dispositive for one group of public employees
and irrelevant to another.
If different standards are being brought to bear on what is essentially
the same inquiry, and if public figure criteria are being improperly trans-
planted into public official turf in a major subcategory of cases, the situ-
ation warrants a common sense review to delineate some of the
important differences between public officials and limited public figures.
The following is a non-exhaustive list of these differences:
* An individual might be a public figure only for purposes of com-
mentary circulated within a limited geographical area. A public official
is no less so regardless of the area over which the offending statements
are spread. The public official concept originated when a Montgomery,
Alabama city commissioner sued not his local paper, but the New York
Times.22
e In the case of a vortex public figure, the actual malice standard ap-
plies only to the controversy for purposes of which the plaintiff is a pub-
lic figure.22 Also, the controversy may not consist of matters that are not
218. True v Ladner, 513 A.2d 257, 264 (Me. 1986); see supra notes 153-57 and accompany-
ing text.
219. Roche v. Egan, 433 A.2d 757 (Me. 1981).
220. 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984).
221. 456 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1984).
222. Some representative police cases from the states in question are: St. Amant v. Thomp-
son, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Gomes v. Fried, 136 Cal. App. 3d 924, 186 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1982);
Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp., 40 Ill. 2d 257, 239 N.E.2d 837 (1968); Orr
v. Lynch, 60 A.D.2d 949, 401 N.Y.S.2d 897, aff'd, 45 N.Y.2d 903, 383 N.E.2d 562, 411
N.Y.S.2d 10 (1978); Torres v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 7 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 1182 (S.D.
Tex. 1980); Pronger v. O'Dell, 127 Wis. 2d 292, 379 N.W.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1985).
Of the states that have declared teachers private figures only Virginia lacks a contradictory
ruling for police; the issue has not been decided in that state. The court in Roche observed, "Our
research has disclosed that every court that has faced the issue has decided that an officer of law
enforcement, from ordinary patrolman to Chief of Police, is a 'public official' within the mean-
ing of federal constitutional law." Roche, 433 A.2d at 762 (citations omitted).
223. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974). The Court referred to
"general fame or notoriety in the community." Id. Prior to Gertz, the Supreme Court recog-
nized a local public figure in Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6
(1970).
224. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
225. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
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generally considered legitimate subjects of interest, however newsworthy
the media may find them. 6 Public officials, on the other hand, are sub-
ject to the New York Times standard for "anything which might touch
on an official's fitness for office."2 7
- Vortex public figures must be involved in a controversy that exists
prior to the alleged defamation or the privilege will not attach. The de-
fendant cannot "bootstrap" a controversy by starting it.2  Criticism of
public officials requires no pre-existing controversy to qualify for the
privilege. 229
* Vortex public figures must be making an effort to influence the reso-
lution of some issue for attacks on them to be privileged, and not, for
example, just commenting on a judicial proceeding that their comments
cannot affect. 23° Public officials are fair game for honestly mistaken re-
marks even if not involved in the matter that spurs the offending com-
mentary.2
* Whether the defendant is a news medium might be relevant to a
public figure question. The distinction between media defendants and
others was apparently rejected by a majority in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. ,232 but the possibility of revisiting the question
was raised later by Justice O'Connor in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps2 3 In public official law, however, the distinction has never mat-
tered. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan23 itself, four ministers were
co-defendants with the newspaper? 5 Garrison v. Louisiana236 and St.
Amant v. Thompson237 also involved non-media defendants.
* After Hutchinson and Wolston, access to effective counter-speech
and assumption of risk enter into vortex public figure determinations.
For public officials, and even for those in their orbit, assumption of
risk has not been a determining factor. For example, the law partner
of a candidate for mayor was treated as a public official for purposes
226. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
227. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
228. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979).
229. See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 64; see also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971);
Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
230. See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454 n.3; see also Wolston v. Readers Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443
U.S. 157 (1979); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
231. See Damron, 401 U.S. at 295.
232. 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens,
J.J., dissenting).
233. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
234. 376 U.S. 254, 257 (1964).
235. Id.
236. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
237. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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of allegations of conflict of interest by the law firm. 238 As for access to
counter-speech, one of Commissioner Sullivan's grievances against the
New York Times was that he could not have a retraction printed. 23 9
IV. ANALYSIS
With these distinctions in mind, one can more fully consider which
factors should enter into an appropriate determination of the status of
public school teachers. The only binding definitional authority for
public officials is found in Rosenblatt: "It is clear, therefore, that the
'public official' designation applies at the very least to those among
the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the
public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the con-
duct of governmental affairs."' ' " More specifically, "[w]here a posi-
tion in government has such apparent importance that the public has
an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the
person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifi-
cations and performance of all government employees . . . the New
York Times malice standards apply." 2A' Underscoring the point that
the position itself rather than any specific controversy is the key, the
Court added: "The employee's position must be one which would in-
vite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely
apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular
charges in controversy. '242
These passages, in a nutshell, are the only definitional authority for
the term "public official." They have been the subject of so much
stubborn misreading that one should pause a moment to appreciate
the sheer expansiveness of this definition. First, it applies at the very
least to those with substantial responsibility for or control over gov-
ernmental affairs. Clearly, it might apply to an even wider circle. 2A3
Second, control over the conduct of governmental affairs is not neces-
sary-substantial responsibility will suffice. Third, even actual respon-
sibility is not necessary-the mere appearance to the public of
responsibility is enough. Finally, no action by the employee in ques-
tion is required-the position itself can invite scrutiny and discussion
of the plaintiff.
238. See Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 A.D.2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823, aff'd., 15 N.Y.2d 1023, 207
N.E.2d 620 (1965).
239. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 261-62.
240. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
241. Id. at 86.
242. Id. at 86-87 n.13.
243. See supra note 208 (providing examples where public official definition has been applied
to an even wider circle).
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Applying these standards to school teachers would seem to be a
fairly straightforward matter. Is the education of students a "govern-
mental affair?" One is hard pressed to deny it. The courts in
Basarich2" and Johnston245 cited provisions of their respective state
constitutions identifying education as a prime governmental responsi-
bility. Many state constitutions have similar provisions. 24 If some
states do not, is a significant portion of the state or local budget de-
voted to education in the jurisdiction where the inquiry arises? Do
teachers have "substantial responsibility" for educating students? If
not, does the public think they do? One can hardly imagine a negative
response to any of these questions.
Do teachers occupy a position of such "apparent importance that
the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and per-
formance of the person who holds [that position], beyond the general
public interest in the qualifications and performance of all govern-
ment employees? ' ' 247 In other words, does the public have an inde-
pendent interest in teachers that it does not confer upon mail carriers,
file clerks, computer programers, accountants, meter readers, and
traffic-light engineers who are employed by government? The answer
seems perfectly obvious. Most people rank their children and grand-
children very high in their hierarchy of values. Students are under the
control of teachers for a major and formative period of their lives.
School attendance up to a certain age is required by law and private
schools are a realistic option for only a minority of families. Moreo-
ver, many teachers have the authority to inflict corporal punishment
upon students against the will of the parents and to decide if a student
is considered an academic success or failure. Most parents take an
acute interest in the "qualifications and performance" of any stranger
who has that kind of power over their children for six or seven hours
per day. This interest is likely to exist even for people who are mostly
indifferent to or ignorant of the "qualifications and performance" of
senators, governors, and the secretary of agriculture-all of whom are
unquestionably public officials.
The author of Rosenblatt, Justice Brennan, later offered some guid-
ance on how to apply the standard to teachers. 248 For him, "the status
of a public school teacher as a 'public official' . . . follows a fortiori
from the reasoning of the Court in Rosenblatt."249 He cited approv-
244. Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill.App. 3d 889, 892, 321 N.E.2d 739, 742 (1974).
245. Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla. 1978).
246. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. IX.
247. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
248. See Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 958.
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ingly the Oklahoma court's finding in Johnston that a teacher is a
public official, calling it a "perfectly obvious conclusion. 250
Suggesting a constitutional conception of teachers, Justice Brennan
drew upon the law of alienage to reinforce his point. In that body of
law, the Supreme Court has drawn bright lines identifying certain oc-
cupations such as teachers, police officers, and probation officers,
along with elected officials, as being exempt from strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment for purposes
of employment discrimination based on citizenship. Positions which
meet this "political function" exemption are those which "go to the
heart of representative government." ' 25' In Ambach v. Norwick the
Court found that teachers serve in such a position and therefore qual-
ify for the "rational relation" test instead of the "strict scrutiny"
test.252 The standards for the political function exemption in alienage
law overlap the Rosenblatt standards for public officials to a remarka-
ble degree. In one of the alienage cases, Bernal v. Fainter,253 the Court
noted that teachers "possess a high degree of responsibility and dis-
cretion in the fulfillment of a basic governmental obligation.' '254
The principal alienage case related to teachers, Ambach, reads as
though it could have been written with the Rosenblatt public official
standards in mind:
Within the public school system, teachers play a critical part in
developing students' attitude toward government and understanding
the role of citizens in our society. Alone among employees of the
system, teachers are in direct, day-to-day contact with students both
in the classrooms and in the other varied activities of a modern
school. In shaping the students' experience to achieve educational
goals, teachers by necessity have wide discretion over the way course
250. Id. at 959 n.3. Justice Brennan further illuminated the meaning of his majority opinion
in Rosenblatt: "We recognized there, however, that First Amendment protection cannot turn on
formalistic tests of how 'high' up the ladder a particular government employee stands. Rather,
we determined, the focus must be on the nature of the public employee's function and the publ-
ic's particular concern with his work." Id. at 957.
The best expression of a contrary view is found in Elder, Defamation, Public Officialdom and
the Rosenblatt v. Baer Criteria-A Proposal for Revivification: Two Decades After New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 33 Btnu'ALo L. REv. 579 (1984). Professor Elder's argument for exempt-
ing employees such as lower level teachers and police officers from the actual malice standard is
sophisticated, massively researched, and yet strained and utterly unpersuasive.
The kind of "formalistic tests" Justice Brennan abjures are advocated in Comment, Teachers
As Plaintiffs in Defamation: Determination of Their Status As Public Officials or Public Fig-
ures, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 433 (1984).
251. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
252. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
253. 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
254. Id. at 220.
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material is communicated to students. They are responsible for
presenting and explaining the subject matter in a way that is both
comprehensible and inspiring. No amount of standardization of
teaching materials or lesson plans can eliminate the personal qualities
a teacher brings to bear in achieving these goals. Further, a teacher
serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle but
important influence over their perceptions and values. Thus, through
both the presentation of course materials and the example he sets, a
teacher has an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students
toward government, the political process, and a citizen's social
responsibilities. This influence is crucial to the continued good health
of a democracy. 25"
These observations are very much in accord with the way the Court
has traditionally conceived the centrality of education to government.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 256 the Court stated: "Providing public schools
ranks at the very apex of the function of a State. ' ' 25 7 The landmark
case Brown v. Board of Education28 provided occasion for the Court
to remark that "education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. ' 25 9 The analysis advanced in Brown in
the context of racial discrimination is equally relevant to the issue at
hand:
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
260
Perhaps the courts that have declined to accept teachers as public
officials do not mean to imply that teachers are unimportant. Cer-
tainly, no court has said as much. One senses in these opinions a sym-
pathy for the plight of teachers. Between the lines is the message that
255. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 78-79 (footnotes omitted).
256. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
257. Id. at 213.
258. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
259. Id. at 493.
260. Id.
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teachers are not well-paid and not accorded their proper respect. They
are frequently blamed for matters beyond their control. They are sad-
dled with a wide range of peripheral responsibilities and then pilloried
for not devoting more time to the classroom. They are pressured to
include a variety of non-traditional material in the curriculum even
while being reviled for departing from the "basics." Additionally,
their redress for reputational damage is limited by the actual malice
privilege in those jurisdictions that correctly apply the public official
rules.
The situation in Franklin,26' which essentially turned the tide by
finding the plaintiff to be a private figure, was especially poignant.
The plaintiff was subjected to a McCarthyite smear that echoed the
worst vituperations of the 1950s for doing no more than exposing her
students to the ideas necessary to make informed decisions on political
and social questions. The fact that the National Education Associa-
tion was listed as amicus curiae for the plaintiff 262 might have been
influential. Given the facts of Franklin, the John Birch Society's treat-
ment of Elmer Gertz263 comes to mind. Although one can sympathize
with the Court's possible motive to protect a teacher from a mindless
propaganda attack, misapplying the public figure principles of Gertz
and its progeny to a public official inquiry ultimately undermines the
freedom that effort seeks to protect.
A recurrent theme in these cases is that making it easier to punish
libel advances academic freedom because teachers will be less afraid to
speak out if they feel more likely to prevail in a defamation action
against a critic. This theory had been rejected in Basarich26 before it
was advanced in Franklin265 and adopted in True.26 This theme en-
tered modern defamation law in a more general way in Justice White's
dissent in Gertz. Justice White contended that stricter burdens of def-
amation proof would lead to "virtually unrestrained defamatory re-
marks about private citizens" which would "discourage them from
speaking out and concerning themselves with social problems. This
would turn the first amendment on its head. ' 267 Justice White's dis-
261. Franklin v. Lodge 1108, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915,
159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979); see supra text accompanying notes 126-33.
262. Id. at 918, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
263. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
264. Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 II1. App. 3d 889, 894, 321 N.E.2d 739, 743 (1974) (rejecting
a claim that freedom of association implies a right of teachers "to be free from comment and
criticism regarding their activities in the school system").
265. Franklin, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
266. True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257, 264 (Me. 1986).
267. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 400 (White, J., dissenting).
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sent in Gertz may be the only time a United States Supreme Court
justice has mistaken the first amendment for a restraint on the speech
of private citizens rather than a restraint on the conduct of govern-
ment. That the first amendment does not protect defamatory speech is
a familiar argument, but the idea that the first amendment should op-
erate to silence some speakers in order to encourage others is, to say
the least, an unusual construction.
In support of his general thesis, Justice White referred to the work
of David Reisman to the effect that libel law was a bulwark for de-
mocracy against the defamatory propaganda the Nazis used to dis-
credit and demoralize their opponents. 268 Reisman wrote: "Thus it is
that the law of libel, with its ecclesiastic background and domestic
character, its aura of heart-balm suits and crusading nineteenth-cen-
tury editors, becomes suddenly important for modern democratic sur-
vival. ''269
Actually, a closer reading of Reisman's article shows that the law of
libel is a two-edged sword-the Nazis actually used the defamation
laws quite effectively to silence their opponents, even before coming
to power.2 70 Indeed, if the history of this century has taught anything,
it is that the expression of one group in society cannot be enriched by
trampling the expression of another. If teachers hesitate to express
their views for fear of provoking harsh rebuttal, they are perhaps
uniquely positioned to seek instruction in how to return critical fire or
rise above it.
Something is inherently self-contradictory in the idea that freedom
of speech is somehow advanced by silencing critics with lawsuits.
Teachers are already protected to some extent by the tenure system.
The Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education271 afforded
teachers themselves an actual malice standard before they can be dis-
missed for criticizing their employers .272 Their professional organiza-
tions provide them with collective strength and vehicles for self-
defense. No basis exists for giving teachers an additional sword
against critics that is not available to other public officials.
According special privileges to teachers as defamation plaintiffs can
follow one of two paths: Either the special status will be confined to
teachers alone, perhaps resting on the academic freedom rationale dis-
cussed above, or else it will spread to other categories of government
268, Id.
269. Reisman, Defamation and Democracy: Fair Game and Fair Comment 1, 42 COLUM. L.
REv. 1085, 1088 (1942).
270. Id. at 1098, 1100-02.
271. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
272. Id. at 574.
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employees. Neither of these results makes good policy sense. The first
alternative is manifestly unfair in its discriminatory impact on other
public employees of comparable status, all of whom could, no doubt,
adduce unique characteristics of their own occupations that should en-
title them to the same preferences. The example of police officers
springs immediately to mind. The second alternative would, in effect,
restore the regime of seditious libel that New York Times and its prog-
eny abolished. The essential breathing space allowed to critics of gov-
ernment would exist only for criticisms implicating officials at the
highest levels of government. Neither alternative could be reasonably
expected to comport with the values of liberty, fairness, and consis-
tency that we, as a culture, wish to associate with constitutional juris-
prudence.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court constitutionalized the law of def-
amation in 1964 by establishing first amendment protection for negli-
gent errors of fact in statements about public officials. Such plaintiffs
could recover damages in defamation only upon a showing of actual
malice, which is proof that the defendant promulgated it with knowl-
edge of its falsity or reckless disregard of whether it was true. The
Court indicated that statements concerning some lower level govern-
ment employees would not necessarily enjoy such expansive protec-
tion, but has never denominated which specific occupational
categories are covered.
Later, the Court expanded its actual malice standard to encompass
persons not employed by government who qualified as public figures
rather than public officials. The Court eventually narrowed the scope
of the public figure doctrine, but gave no indication of receding from
the more expansive protection accorded to statements about public of-
ficials. State courts are badly split over whether public school teachers
qualify as public officials. In states that resolved the question prior to
1979, teachers were consistently held to be public officials. After that,
with one major exception, the results have been the opposite.
This change coincides with the United States Supreme Court's nar-
rowing of the public figure doctrine, specifically the Court's introduc-
tion of new factors into the determination of public figure status:
whether a plaintiff assumed a risk of defamation and had access to
effective means of counter-speech. Such factors were never intended
to play even a minor role in determining whether a plaintiff is a public
official as opposed to a public figure.
Some state courts began to apply these factors to public official in-
quiries, at least where teachers were concerned, and others followed
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suit. Analysis of the pertinent body of Supreme Court opinions shows
that these applications are clearly erroneous; so too does a dissent, by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, from a denial of certiorari in one of
the erroneous cases. The Ohio Supreme Court later overturned its
holding partly as a result of comments in that dissent.
An unrelated body of constitutional law, the law of alienage, af-
fords some guidance. States are permitted to discriminate on the basis
of citizenship in hiring certain public employees whose positions are
said to go to the heart of representative government. Public school
teachers hold one of the positions considered important enough to be
so denominated. The importance of public school teachers to a demo-
cratic society is further underscored in several of the Supreme Court's
school desegregation cases.
State courts holding that a teacher is not a public official have con-
sistently ruled the opposite with respect to a police officer-a position
of comparable status, compensation, and public importance. Moreo-
ver, the cases concerning police have omitted consideration of the fac-
tors of risk assumption and access to counter-speech which were
erroneously applied in some of the teacher cases. This inconsistency
not only has created inaccurate status determination in some of the
cases involving teachers, but also has thrown into confusion the
method courts should use in arriving at public official determinations.
A set of criteria can hardly be dispositive for one occupational cate-
gory and irrelevant to another.
Resolving the conflict in favor of holding teachers to be public offi-
cials would ensure fairness to comparable public employees who are
so denominated. More importantly, such an outcome could prevent
the revival of the doctrine of seditious libel.
1990]
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APPENDIX
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Mahoney' 87 X X X N.Y.
Lipscomb' 87 X I X X Va.
Scott3  86 X X I X Ohio
True' 86 X X I I _I _X Me.
Nodarl 84 X X X I I I X Fla.
Milkovich' 84 __ X X X Ohio
Luperl 83 X X X I I I X Okla.
Renwick' 83 X X X X N.C.
Van Dyke' 83 X I I X X I X Utah
Stevens1°  83 X X X Ill.
Hicks" 82 X X X X X La.
Byers 2  82 X X X X Ga.
Foote" 82 X X X X X La.
Creps 4  82 X X X X Ohio
Colson" 82 X X X X Ill.
McCutcheon" 81 X X X X X IlL.
Fleming 7  81 _ X X X X X Va.
DeLuca" 81 X X X X X N.Y.
Defley 9  81 X X X La.
Torgerson2°  81 X X X X X Minn.
Avins21 80 X X X X X I Del.
Franklin" 79 X X X Cal.
Poe 3  79 X X I X Tex.
Cone'* 79 X X X Ga.
Winter2  78 _ X X X _ X N.Y.
Johnston" 78 X X X Okla.
Sewell17 78 X X X Ariz.
Early" 76 X X X Fla.
Kapiloff29  75 X X X _ X Md.
Johnson °  75 X X X IX Ill.
Basarich3 ' 74 X X X I I X Ill.
Gallman32  73 X X X X X _ X I I Ark.
Sanders3  72 X X X I X Va.
Time34  71 X X XXX X N.C.
Grayson 5  67 X X X X X Wash.
Reaves"' 67 X X X _ _ Miss.
Butts]' 67 X X X X X X Ga.
Ranous3 ' 66 X X X X Wis.
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1. Mahoney v. Adirondack Publishing Co., 71 N.Y.2d 31, 517 N.E.2d 1365 (1987) (hold-
ing as public figure high school coach accused of telling quarterback to "get your head out of
your &!(!!(&," even though New York courts tend to confer public status sparingly because they
provide extra protection for defendants by requiring a gross negligence standard for all plaintiffs
where a matter of public concern is involved, Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 N.Y.2d
196, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975)).
2. Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Lipscomb, 234 Va. 277, 362 S.E.2d 32 (1987) (holding as
private figure a teacher accused of incompetence by parents), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988).
3. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986) (holding as public
official a school superintendent accused of lying to cover up coach's misconduct in brawl at
wrestling match).
4. True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986) (holding as private figure teacher given nega-
tive job reference by supervisor).
5. Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984) (holding as private figure teacher criti-
cized as unqualified by parents).
6. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984) (holding as
private figure a coach accused of inciting donnybrook at high school wrestling match), cert.
denied sub nom. Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953 (1985), overruled, Scott v.
News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
7. Luper v. Black Dispatch Publishing Co., 675 P.2d 1028 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
as both a public official and public figure a teacher and civil rights activist whose deranged
former husband managed to convince a newspaper to print a variety of allegations, including
mass murder, against her).
8. Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 63 N.C. App. 200, 304 S.E.2d 593 (1983)
(holding as public figure a state university dean for purposes of affirmative action controversy,
but not reaching public official question), rev'd on other grounds, 310 N.C. 312, S.E.2d 405,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984).
9. Van Dyke v. KUTV, 663 P.2d 52 (Utah 1983) (holding as public official a state college
financial aid director accused of sexually harassing students).
10. Stevens v. Tillman, 568 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding as private figure a white
principal in racial controversy with black parents), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1339 (1989).
11. Hicks v. Stone, 425 So. 2d 807 (La. Ct. App.) (holding as public official a state univer-
sity dean blamed for program's loss of accreditation), cert. denied, 429 So. 2d 129 (La. 1982).
12. Byers v. Southeastern Newspapers Corp., 161 Ga. App. 717, 288 S.E.2d 698 (1982)
(holding as public figure a state college dean for purposes of a controversy surrounding abolition
of his job, but not reaching public official question).
13. Foote v. Sarafyan, 432 So. 2d 877 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (holding as private figures state
college professors and chairman in controversy over academic competence and "payroll fraud,"
but applying common law privilege).
14. Creps v. Waltz, 5 Ohio App. 3d 213, 450 N.E.2d 716 (1982) (not reaching determina-
tion of status of adjunct professor of real estate at state college said to be unfit for job by local
real estate brokers angered by professor's business practices, but applying common law privi-
lege).
15. Colson v. Stieg, 89 Ill. 2d 205, 433 N.E.2d 246 (1982) (avoiding question of public
status, but adding actual malice standard to state common law privilege for purposes of tenure
determinations in schools).
16. McCutcheon v. Moran, 99 111. App. 3d 421, 425 N.E.2d 1130 (1981) (holding as private
figure teacher/principal accused of kicking janitor in buttocks).
17. Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 275 S.E.2d 632 (1981) (holding as private figure a state
university professor for purposes of allegations of racism in zoning controversy unrelated to
job).
18. DeLuca v. New York News Inc., 109 Misc. 2d 341, 438 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1981)
(holding as private figure a former public school teacher for allegations of improper receipt of
salary while on disability leave).
19. State v. Defley, 395 So. 2d 759 (La. 1981) (holding as public officials, in criminal libel
case, deceased school superintendent and supervisor for purposes of allegations that they had
been drunkards who resisted school integration).
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20. Torgerson v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 7 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 1805 (Minn.
4th Dist. Ct. 1981) (holding as public figure a private law school dean for purposes of contro-
versy over legitimacy of law school).
21. Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637 (3d Cir.) (holding as public figure a private law school
dean in controversy over denial of American Bar Association accreditation), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 982 (1980).
22. Franklin v. Lodge 1108, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915,
159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979) (holding as private figure a high school teacher accused of expounding
"communist, Godless philosophies to our young people" who lost previous job for that reason).
23. Poe v. San Antonio Express-News Co., 590 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (holding
as private figure a teacher accused of fondling fourteen-year-old student).
24. Cone v. John H. Phipps Broadcasting Stations, 5 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 1972 (N.D.
Ga. 1979) (holding as public official a school superintendent accused of financial irregularities).
25. Winter v. Northern Tier Publishing Co., 4 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 1348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1978) (applying common law privilege and holding as private figure a coach accused of cursing
and threatening referees).
26. Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978) (holding as public
official an elementary school wrestling coach accused of forcing sixth-grader to crawl naked
through the legs of his teammates while they struck him).
27. Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 581 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding as public
official a high school chemistry teacher called incompetent by parents).
28. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Early, 334 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (holding as
public official elected superintendent of schools accused of incompetence in long series of arti-
cles), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
29. Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 343 A.2d 251 (1975) (holding as "public figure-
public official" a school principal ranked low among his peers by newspaper), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 907 (1976).
30. Johnson v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 508, 31 111. App. 3d 270, 334 N.E.2d 442
(1975) (holding as public figures professors active in controversy over textbooks).
31. Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill. App. 3d 889, 321 N.E.2d 739 (1974) (holding as public
officials teachers and coaches criticized for union activity).
32. Gallman v. Carnes, 254 Ark. 987, 497 S.W.2d 47 (1973) (holding as public official an
assistant dean/law professor accused of inept scholarship).
33. Sanders v. Harris, 213 Va. 369, 192 S.E.2d 754 (1972) (not making status determina-
tion, but requiring professor involved in administrative dispute to show actual malice to recover
in defamation action).
34. Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971) (holding as public figure a private
college coach and former professional basketball player for purposes of comment that he had
been "destroyed" by the superior skill of Boston Celtics star Bill Russell).
35. Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 72 Wash. 2d 999, 436 P.2d 756 (1967) (holding as
public figure a coach of state university basketball team, who was technically employed by a
university-related private corporation, for purposes of allegations that he followed a strategy of
bullying referees).
36. Reaves v. Foster, 200 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1967) (holding as public official a school princi-
pal accused of incompetence).
37. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (holding as public figure a state
university athletic director/former coach, who was technically employed by a university-related
private corporation, for purposes of allegations of conspiring to rig a game).
38. Ranous v. Hughes, 30 Wis. 2d 452, 141 N.W.2d 251 (1966) (holding as private figure,
where defendants failed to assert otherwise, a teacher accused of rebuking and punishing chil-
dren who expressed grief at assasination of President Kennedy).
